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In recent years economists have come to see rich natural resource endowments as a 
“curse” or “precious bane” that undermines development and slows economic growth.   
Resource-based development undeniably involves major risks.  Nonetheless, the resource curse 
is not inevitable, as the examples of Australia, Canada and the Scandinavian countries 
demonstrate.  This paper argues that the challenges posed by resource dependence, which 
include an increased vulnerability to external shocks, the risk of “Dutch disease” and the risk 
of developing specific institutional pathologies, can be overcome, or at least very substantially 
mitigated, if accompanied by the right economic policies.  It then analyses what these policies 
are, and how to set up economic and political framework conditions to facilitate their 
implementation.  The paper looks specifically at Russia as a prominent example of a resource-
based economy.  It investigates briefly the main sources of Russian growth in recent years, and 
makes specific recommendations that would help the Russian economy to sustain high rates of 
economic growth. 
Introduction1 
In the 1950s and 1960s economists generally saw abundant natural resource endowments as 
facilitating a country’s rapid development,2 but in the last two decades many have come to see natural 
resources as an obstacle to successful development.  A large empirical literature has investigated the 
existence of a so-called “resource curse”3 and speculated on its underlying causes.4  This paper argues 
that the resource curse is not inevitable.  If a suitable economic and political framework can be 
established, natural resource abundance need not prevent successful economic development, as the 
examples of Australia, Canada and the Scandinavian countries demonstrate.  Nonetheless, resource-
based development obviously presents important challenges.  These include an increased vulnerability 
to external shocks, the risk of “Dutch disease”, and the institutional pathologies often associated with 
heavy reliance on natural resource sectors.  These challenges are serious, but they can be met, or at 
least substantially so, with the aid of appropriate institutions and policies.  The main aim of this paper 
is thus to analyse what the “right policies” might be.  General concepts are first discussed, before 
turning to the specific case of Russia. 
The first part of the paper discusses the policies required for successfully developing a resource-
based economy.  It is argued that resource-based development places a priority on good 
macroeconomic management, particularly sound fiscal policy.  Turning to institutions, it is stressed 
that an honest and efficient state apparatus is particularly important in a resource-based economy, and 
that the creation of such an apparatus is facilitated by the presence of a strong civil society.  Finally, to 
the extent that a more diversified economy is less prone to the risks mentioned above, diversifying a 
resource-based economy can also solve potential problems of resource dependence.  The paper 
therefore also explores the possibilities for resource-based economies to accelerate the diversification 
of their economic structures. 
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The second part of the paper looks specifically at the Russian economy which in recent years has 
been a prominent example of resource-based development.  The main sources of its recent growth are 
briefly examined, and the underlying policies assessed against the framework suggested in the first 
part of the paper.  The role of the oil sector, and particularly of privately-owned oil companies, is 
shown to have been crucial in driving economic growth during 2001-2004.  Almost one quarter of the 
growth during this period can be directly attributed to increased production by private oil companies.  
It is argued that, given its current economic structure, Russia is bound to remain a heavily resource-
dependent economy for some time to come.  Taking this into account, and based on the normative 
framework developed in the first part of the paper, detailed suggestions are made on how to manage 
successfully the Russian economy and to facilitate its economic diversification.  
I.  The challenge of sustaining growth in a resource-based economy – main 
concepts 
A. Resource-based  economies 
In a large number of low- or middle-income economies, industrial production and exports are 
often heavily biased towards natural resources.  This is the case for most African, Latin American and 
CIS countries.  Whether such resources are a curse or whether (and how) they can be exploited to the 
benefit of the country and all its citizens is thus very relevant for a large proportion of the world’s 
population. 
Resource-based economies are often – although somewhat arbitrarily – defined as economies in 
which natural resources account for more than 10 per cent of GDP and 40 per cent of exports.  As 
commodity prices are often very volatile, such economies are particularly vulnerable to external 
shocks.  
Having a rich natural resource base, however, has some obvious advantages.  Natural resources 
can provide a source of export revenue.  For the poorest countries, such revenue allows the import of 
crucial goods (e.g. medicines) that cannot be produced domestically.  From a practical point of view, 
natural resources also provide some shelter against international competition.  It is a banal point – but 
worth stating – that in order to compete in natural resources, a necessary condition is that a country 
must possess the relevant deposits, and neither advanced technology nor ultra-cheap labour can change 
that.  
On the negative side, it has been argued that the growth potential of natural resource sectors can 
be comparatively low.  There are two reasons why this might be the case.  First, natural resources are 
finite.  Second, it is often claimed that natural resource extraction involves low levels of technology, 
and hence the potential for productivity increases is limited.5  The latter is also one of the most 
common economic explanations of why there might be a resource curse.  Both of these arguments, 
however, are questionable.  Undeniably, natural resources are ultimately finite, but the total stock of a 
natural resource is not particularly relevant until its total depletion is in sight.  What is important is the 
quantity of known natural resource deposits that can be exploited profitably at current technology 
levels and expected long-term average prices.  Since there has been considerable technological 
progress in resource extraction, for most commodities the volume of exploitable deposits has not been 
falling in recent decades.  
Nor is it the case that specialization in natural resources inevitably implies low levels of 
technological know-how.  Resource extraction – especially when it moves to deposits that are more 
difficult to exploit – has become quite intensive in the use of specific high technologies (e.g. oil 
platforms).6  To the degree that one of the main economic explanations for a resource curse rests on the 
low-tech character of resource extraction, it is doubtful whether such an outcome is really inevitable.  
Poor economic performance may be due not to resource abundance as such but to the structures of 
ownership and control over the resources.  In many countries, resource sectors have been dominated 
by state-owned or state-controlled enterprises.  Given the evidence that private enterprises tend to be 5 
more efficient than state-owned ones in most sectors,7 the weak growth performance of resource-based 
economies may have been due to state ownership of large parts of those economies, rather than to 
natural resources per se.8  This said, not all forms of private ownership of resource sectors may be 
equally desirable.  Different forms of private ownership (e.g. domestic, foreign or mixed ownership), 
as well as the structure of the natural resource sectors (e.g. competitive versus monopolies) may have 
different implications for economic development.  These arguments have not been tested properly as 
most of the empirical work on the resource curse has focused on the hydrocarbon and hard mineral 
sectors since the late 1950s, a period during which the majority of states with large natural resource 
sectors exercised a high degree of state ownership and control.   
Regardless of the desirability of being a resource-based economy, changes in the structure of an 
economy are usually unavoidably slow, which means that today’s resource-based economies are 
bound to remain as such for some time to come.  Resource-based development, however, can 
nevertheless be a source of growth and modernization, especially via exports, as the Chilean 
example shows.  Increasing incomes, in turn, can lead to the expansion of a country’s non-tradable 
sector, principally of services and construction.  Growing resource exports also increase a country’s 
capacity to import, especially of investment goods.  Developing a country’s natural resources, via 
increased imports and expansion of the service sector, can therefore help the process of modernizing a 
country. 
Nonetheless, there are major risks in a resource-based economy that need to be addressed.  These 
include its vulnerability to external shocks, the “Dutch disease”, and the “political economy” problems 
that are often associated with resource-based development.  Each of these is addressed in turn. 
B.  Vulnerability to external shocks 
Crises in emerging market economies are commonly caused by large terms of trade shocks 
arising from sharp falls in the prices of their main export commodities,9 and resource-based economies 
are particularly exposed to this kind of risk.  The margin of error for resource-based economies is much 
smaller than for economies with more diversified economic structures.  Good macroeconomic 
management can help to reduce the vulnerability of resource-based economies to external shocks, and 
encourage successful resource-based development.  In this respect fiscal discipline is important: good 
fiscal policy cannot eliminate the vulnerability to external shocks, but it can go a long way to mitigate 
them.  Fiscal imbalances can magnify, rather than dampen, the effects of commodity price fluctuations 
on the domestic economy.  What is needed therefore is a counter-cyclical fiscal policy with respect to 
commodity prices, the budget being kept in balance across the commodity price cycle.  Moreover, 
fiscal policy should always be based on conservative price assumptions for the major export 
commodities: a budget that balances only because of exceptionally high commodity prices is not really 
in balance at all.  
In order to achieve balance across the commodity price cycle, the creation of a stabilization fund 
can generally be very helpful.  Such a fund accumulates windfall government revenues when prices 
are above trend and releases them when they fall below.  The legal authority of such a fund and the 
rules determining how revenues should be accumulated, invested and spent should be strict and 
transparent.  The stabilization fund can serve a number of functions.  
First, it can help to smooth government revenues – and thus government spending – over the 
commodity price cycle.  For this to work effectively, it is necessary that the stabilization fund be large 
enough to insure the budget against several years of below-average commodity prices.  In theory, such 
smoothing could also be achieved by borrowing abroad when commodity prices are low, and repaying 
the debt when they are high.  In practice, however, resource-based economies often find that their 
access to international credit is severely constrained when prices are low.  When commodity prices 
fall, current account problems are likely to arise and attempts to borrow are unlikely to be viewed 
favourably by the financial markets.  Moreover, if they are able to borrow they are likely to have to 
pay a very high price.  Hence, a stabilization fund that can be used to finance government expenditure 
when prices are low is by far the preferred option.  6 
Second, a stabilization fund not only serves to smooth government expenditures, but can also help 
to reduce fluctuations in the rate of growth.  As economic growth is partially driven by changes in the 
terms of trade, the fund reduces the risk of overheating when the economy is growing strongly, and 
provides a stimulus when growth is below potential.   
Third, a stabilization fund can also serve to reduce exchange rate fluctuations.  This arises if the 
investment and spending pattern of the stabilization fund described above contributes to capital 
outflows when commodity prices are high and to capital inflows when they are low.  Such flows can 
thus help to counteract current account pressure on the exchange rate, thus shielding the economy to 
some degree from potentially damaging fluctuations in the exchange rate. 
Whatever the desired size of a stabilization fund, it may at some time reach the point where 
further accumulation would be unnecessary and even undesirable.  After all, the insurance provided by 
the fund comes at a price.  A country will then need to decide what to do with any further windfall 
revenues arising from high commodity prices.  The temptation to use them to finance tax cuts or 
higher levels of non-interest spending might have to be resisted if they were to increase the risk of 
overheating.  It could also jeopardize the fiscal position as and when commodity prices eventually fell.  
The urge to spend at least some windfall revenues – or to use them to reduce taxes – is, of course, 
understandable, given the many urgent calls on the public purse in low- and middle-income countries.  
However, if the authorities wish to use windfall revenues to finance sustainable tax cuts or expenditure 
increases, then the best strategy might be to use surplus revenues in the first instance for early debt 
repayment.  This would reduce the government’s future liabilities and thus allow for higher spending 
or lower taxation in subsequent years – without betting on continued high commodity prices.  Using 
surplus revenues for debt repayment would also help to reduce the risk of currency crises and to limit 
their impact if they occur.  
Once the stabilization fund has reached a size considered sufficient for stabilization purposes, the 
authorities might also wish to consider accumulating additional revenue windfalls in a fully-funded 
pillar of the state pension system – assuming of course that such a system exists.  Apart from being a 
macroeconomically responsible way of distributing the windfall to the population, this would help to 
strengthen the pension rights of those who, owing to age or income, would otherwise have little or no 
claim to a pension from the fully-funded pillar.  
Low levels of external debt also help to reduce vulnerability to external shocks, both by 
decreasing the risk of currency crises and by limiting the damage from such crises if they do occur.  In 
this respect, the need for low levels of external debt applies equally to the public and private sectors.  It 
is therefore important to make sure that the private sector’s external borrowing does not reach 
dangerous levels.  Empirical work suggests that external debt above a certain level has a negative 
impact on growth.10  To reduce an external debt level, it is not necessary to reduce the public debt 
burden.  By issuing long-term debt in domestic rather than foreign currency, external debt is likely to 
fall since there is usually no significant international market for long-term domestic paper.  In any 
case, sovereign debt should ideally be predominantly in domestic currency, or at least indexed to a 
relevant commodity price or commodity price basket, so that debt service rises and falls in line with 
commodity prices.  So far, bonds indexed to commodity prices have been issued mainly in the context 
of sovereign debt restructurings or by private companies, but there is no obvious reason that would 
prevent them from being used more widely for sovereign issues.11  Such bonds should attract those 
seeking a hedge against commodity price rises, especially as the possibilities for long-term hedging in 
commodity markets are relatively limited. 
Resource-based economies also need a significant degree of exchange rate flexibility in order to 
be able to accommodate shifts in their terms of trade.  When commodity prices are rising, currencies 
may become fundamentally overvalued, increasing the risk of large and painful depreciations when 
prices fall.  Hence there may be a place for efforts to avoid excessive exchange rate appreciation, 
especially when the prices of major export commodities are high and there are large short-term capital 
inflows.  Nonetheless, pursuing such exchange rate goals may be costly in terms of inflation unless 
there is the political will for sufficient fiscal sterilization, and the technical capacity for monetary 7 
sterilization.  This reinforces the need for resource-based economies to have a stabilization fund, but it 
also implies that their central banks need to have the capacity for monetary sterilization.  Such 
economies should have a large market in domestic currency government debt, and it may also be 
useful to allow the central bank to issue securities.  
More generally, dollarization (or euro-ization) of a resource-based economy should be avoided, 
with prices and contracts being denominated in local currency as far as possible.  Borrowing, saving, 
setting prices or concluding contracts in an external currency may be rational and beneficial for 
individual households, enterprises or banks.  However, general resort to a non-domestic currency 
implies a major risk to economic stability in the event of large exchange rate fluctuations, and is 
therefore better avoided in resource-based economies. 
C. Dutch  disease 
The development of a country’s natural resources often increases the risk of Dutch disease, a term 
that is used by economists to describe a situation where the discovery and subsequent export of large 
quantities of natural resources raises the equilibrium exchange rate and/or general wage level, thereby 
putting pressure on the competitiveness of the other tradable sectors in the economy.12  
An appreciation of the equilibrium exchange rate is not entirely bad news as it increases the 
purchasing power of the population (as imported goods become cheaper) and therefore raises living 
standards.  The increased spending also usually boosts production in the non-tradable sector.  The 
drawback, however, is that the competitiveness of the non-resource-based tradable sectors, such as 
manufacturing, is undermined.  To be able to continue exporting, or at least to withstand import 
competition, these sectors must therefore increase productivity sufficiently in order to maintain their 
competitiveness.  
While productivity increases as such are obviously welcome, a potential problem is that the 
pressure from the appreciating exchange rate on the non-resource tradable sectors may ultimately 
affect equilibrium employment levels.  The resource sector usually provides relatively little 
employment itself.  Therefore, if resource-based currency strength leads to a more capital- and less 
labour-intensive production pattern in other industrial sectors, it risks reducing the level of industrial 
employment.  This may not be a problem if growth in some of the non-resource-based activities is 
sufficiently strong to create the necessary jobs.  An expansion of the service sector, in particular, could 
compensate for lost industrial jobs, but a significant part of the potential employment opportunities in 
the service sector may be of rather low productivity, which would imply relatively low wages.  This 
could lead to social tensions. 
The potentially negative impact of the natural resource sector on the economy, however, can be 
mitigated by appropriate policies.  The tax system, for example, can be instrumental in avoiding the 
Dutch disease and assisting the development of the non-resource sector.  More precisely, direct 
taxation of the natural resource sectors could be increased, as long as they remain sufficiently 
profitable to allow for their further development.  The proceeds of the increased resource taxes could 
then be used to lower overall tax levels in the economy and in particular to cut non-wage labour costs.  
While lower non-wage costs might in some sectors be wholly or partly offset by wage increases, they 
should at least reduce total labour costs in sectors with low productivity.  Obviously, cuts in non-wage 
labour costs may lead to shortfalls in social security or pension funds, but these could be compensated 
with part of the resource tax revenues.  Moreover, taxing resource rents should also lower wages in the 
resource sector and hence diminish the pressure on wages elsewhere.  As this leads to lower wages for 
activities with relatively lower productivity, it would also help to preserve employment that would 
otherwise be lost or to create new employment opportunities that would otherwise not arise.  
While orienting the tax system towards the resource sector can help to alleviate the Dutch disease, 
it also increases the dependence of the budget on commodity prices.  This, however, should not be 
seen as a deterrent to such a change; rather, it underlines the importance of having a sufficiently large 
stabilization fund. 8 
D.  Political economy challenges 
As already pointed out, many – if not most – of the potential macroeconomic problems arising 
from resource dependence can be resolved or at least significantly reduced by following appropriate 
macroeconomic policies and undertaking structural reforms.  The potential political economy 
implications may therefore be the toughest problems that resource-based economies face.  The 
economic literature suggests a number of reasons why endowment of natural resources may 
complicate economic development.  Among these, the incentives for rent-seeking are prominent.  
First, the allocation of talent in natural resource economies may be biased in favour of the resource 
sector, as capable individuals focus on securing resource rents rather than building successful 
businesses in other sectors.13 Secondly, countries with resource-based economies are also more 
likely to experience rebellions and civil wars, which to some degree are simply a consequence of 
rent-seeking being pushed to the extreme.14 Thirdly, it has been shown that a large share of natural 
resources in exports tends to be associated with more corruption,15 which, in turn, is associated with 
lower rates of long-term growth.16 And finally, a larger natural resource share in the economy is often 
accompanied by greater inequality of incomes, which also tends to undermine long-term economic 
growth. 
As rent-seeking or its consequences underlie most of these problems, part of the solution is 
simply to tax away a fair share of the resource rent.  For example, to the degree that inequality is 
driven by the fact that those active in natural resource sectors (owners, managers and workers 
alike) get their share of the resource rent, and hence are usually doing far better than those in 
similar positions in other sectors, taking away these rents goes a long way in solving the problem.  
The money thus collected can then be transferred to the population at large through generally 
lower tax levels.  Using part of the tax to increase targeted social transfers may also help to reduce 
inequality, especially in countries where the social safety nets are weak.  By providing the state with 
additional resources to reduce income inequality, the risk of social tensions, rebellion and civil war 
may also be lowered.  A large reduction in resource rents going to individuals instead of the state 
would also help to weaken the potential misallocation of talent to resource sectors.  The main 
obstacle to achieving this is that it requires an efficient and honest administration; otherwise, 
resource rents are simply divided between resource companies and their bureaucratic counterparts, 
with only a minor share going to the state.  Hence an effective state relatively free of corruption is 
one of the key conditions for meeting the political economy challenges associated with resource 
dependence. 
There are various measures that can be taken to limit corruption.  One is to create more 
corruption-resistant structures.  Rules, when necessary, should be simple, transparent and standardized, 
with few exceptions and as little reliance as possible on bureaucratic discretion.  However, while 
effective legislation is important, it will not be sufficient as long as corruption goes largely unpunished 
because of a lack of monitoring.  Cross-country research shows that both an effective rule of law and a 
developed civil society are strongly and negatively correlated with corruption.17  The evidence also 
demonstrates that a lack of press freedom increases corruption.18  An independent judiciary, a free 
press and a strong civil society are not luxuries, but are important in reducing and keeping down 
corruption, and thus for promoting long-term economic development.  
All resource-based economies that have developed successfully have had strong civil societies, 
relatively well-functioning and independent judicial systems, high levels of press freedom and 
relatively low levels of corruption, whereas resource economies that have failed to achieve adequate 
rates of economic progress have usually lacked most of these features.  There is also tentative evidence 
that resource-based development has generally been more successful when state ownership in the 
resource sectors has been absent or very limited.19 In this respect, the contrast between the mainly 
state-owned Russian gas sector and the (until 2005) almost entirely privately-owned oil sector is 
suggestive.  While from 2000 to 2004, the latter was one of the main engines of Russian growth, the 
former continued to stagnate. 9 
E. Diversification 
Given the right institutions and policies, developing a successful modern economy based on natural 
resource exports is feasible, as the examples of Australia, Canada and the Scandinavian countries 
demonstrate.  As stated above, however, there are risks associated with being highly dependent on a 
limited number of resource-based sectors.  Therefore a more diversified economic structure is something 
that in principle is desirable.  It will, however, be important not to lose sight of what diversification 
policies can and cannot achieve.  First, it must be clear that there is no miracle recipe to achieve 
diversification quickly.  Fostering it will be a long, drawn-out process, and should hence be seen as a 
long-term goal.  Second, there is no shortage of examples of failed diversification policies, and 
economists know fairly well on the basis of international experience what does not work.  Fiscal 
irresponsibility as well as large-scale state investment in pet industrial projects rank at the top of the list 
of what should be avoided.  Unfortunately, there is less agreement among economists as to what does 
work, as policies that work well in one place often fail dramatically elsewhere.  Indeed, failures have 
been so common (and sometimes so spectacular) that, in recent years, economists have often preferred 
not to give any advice at all with respect to diversification policies.  
Nevertheless, there are some policies that are both helpful in fostering diversification and are fairly 
uncontroversial.  Broadly speaking, they consist of getting the framework conditions for 
entrepreneurship right, making sure that the business environment is generally competitive and that there 
are sufficient incentives to invest in non-resource sectors.  As such, they involve a large number of 
structural reforms typically advocated by mainstream economics.  However, reasonable doubts have 
been voiced as to whether these policies are sufficient to achieve the stated goal of diversification in a 
reasonable time span.  While acknowledging the need for good framework conditions for business as a 
sine qua non, some economists have advocated “new style” industrial policies as a supplement to the 
structural reform agenda.  
The most conventional approach is to use the tax system to promote the development of the non-
resource sector.  As the type of tax policies required are similar to those needed to combat the Dutch 
disease, and which have already been discussed in section I.C above, only the guiding principle is 
repeated here, namely, that there should be extensive use of taxes that specifically target the resource 
sectors, and that the revenue from these be used to lower the overall tax rate. 
In addition to tax policy, there is also a long list of structural reforms, including financial and 
administrative, that are particularly important for facilitating the diversification of economic 
activity.  Mechanisms for efficiently allocating investment between – and not merely within – 
economic sectors are important.  Setting up the framework to allow the banking sector to develop 
– while making sure that it remains sound – is thus a key priority.20  Facilitating the emergence of 
a venture capital industry would also be helpful, especially in those resource-dependent countries 
that have a relatively advanced technological potential.  At the same time, there is often a crucial 
need to improve the basic framework conditions for business, particularly for small- and medium-
sized enterprises (SME).  In many resource-based economies, there is considerable scope to 
reduce the burdens of heavy regulation and a corrupt bureaucracy which, in addition to 
strengthening the financial system, would help to create a more level playing field for enterprises 
and lower barriers to entry. 
Less conventional “new-style” interventions include the creation of programmes that would 
directly improve the productivity and competitiveness of selected enterprises, which to some degree 
could serve as an example to others.  The guiding principles of such programmes usually include that 
they be transparent, that participation in them be determined by private sector representatives, and that 
the period during which any single enterprise can participate be strictly limited.  Programmes should 
not involve significant transfers of resources to participating enterprises, but rather focus on the 
transfer of knowledge or skills, such as new production, management or marketing techniques, or the 
dissemination of specific information (e.g. about potential export markets).  An extensive discussion of 
“new style” industrial policy is beyond the scope of this paper, but one can be found in UNECE.21 10 
CHART 1 
The structure of industrial value added in Russia, 2000 
(Percentage shares of GDP) 
 





































Source:  Russian Federal Service for State Statistics; World Bank, “Russia: transition meets development”, country economic memorandum for the
Russian Federation (Moscow), April 2004; author’s estimates and calculations.  
Note:  Weights estimated by the World Bank.  
 
II.  The Russian case 
A.  Sources of Russian growth, 1999-2004 
Russian real GDP grew at just under 6.8 per cent per annum between 1999 and 2004, much 
faster and more sustained than most observers thought possible in the wake of the 1998 financial 
crisis.22  Given that there has been – and still is – considerable doubt about Russia’s potential for 
sustained and rapid growth, a clear understanding of the factors and policies that have underpinned 
Russia’s performance is important for any attempt to assess the conditions under which Russia could 
maintain high growth rates in the future. 
The starting point for analysis must be an understanding of Russia’s existing economic structure.  
Russian official data, although technically correct, present a somewhat distorted picture of the 
economy because a large share of the value added generated by the natural resource sectors is reflected 
not in the accounts of the extraction companies but in those of their affiliated trading companies.  This 
practice is most common when output is exported, especially if the domestic and export prices of the 
goods involved differ substantially.  As a result, export-oriented industries are underrepresented in 
industrial production, and industry as a whole is underrepresented in the Russian national accounts.  
Trade, and hence the service sector, is overrepresented.  
There have recently been several attempts to correct for these distortions, and this analysis relies 
on one of them – the recent World Bank23 estimates of the relative weights of different sectors in 
GDP.24 According to these estimates the share of industry increases from 27 to 41 per cent, and the oil 
and gas sector’s share of GDP rises from around 8 per cent in the Goskomstat data for 2000 to just 
above 19 per cent.  This is broadly in line with the estimates of the Economic Expert Group attached to 
the Russian Ministry of Finance, which suggest that the oil and gas sector’s share of GDP was around 
21 per cent in 2000 and has hovered at around 17 per cent thereafter.25 At the same time, the share of 
services falls from 60 to 46 per cent when employing the World Bank weights, which seems far more 
plausible.  Chart 1 shows the structure of value added in industry according to the official and the 
adjusted weights.  11 
When the adjusted weights are used, overall economic growth is seen to have been relatively 
broad based.  Immediately after the 1998 crisis it was overwhelmingly driven by industry and 
construction, but the relative importance of the service sector has been increasing, especially in 2002-
2004, and even with the adjusted weights services still account for roughly one third of growth during 
this period.26  Industrial growth, however, has been highly concentrated, and the role of energy in 
Russia’s expansion is striking.  Natural resource sectors27 directly accounted for roughly 70 per cent of 
the growth of industrial production in 2001-2004, with the oil sector alone accounting for just under 45 
per cent (chart 2).  This implies that the natural resource sectors directly contributed more than one 
third of Russian GDP growth over the period, the oil industry alone accounting for close to one 
quarter.28  It should be noted that this includes 
only the direct contribution of the oil sector to 
growth: taking into account the indirect effects of 
oil sector procurement and wages on domestic 
demand, the actual contribution of the oil industry 
to economic growth was greater still. 
This contrasts with developments in the 
period immediately after the crisis.  Then, 
Russian industry profited from a sharply devalued 
exchange rate and a large reduction in real energy 
prices, and these two factors were the major 
sources of the industrial recovery in 1999-2000.  
However, as both the real exchange rate and 
energy prices recovered from their exceptionally 
and unsustainably low levels, the boost to growth 
from the devaluation gradually disappeared. 
From the supply side, growth was almost 
certainly driven by large increases in total factor 
productivity,29 while on the demand side the main 
factor was the rapid increase in private sector 
demand.30  In this respect it is important to note 
that, especially in 2003-2004, fiscal restraint 
played a major role in preventing the Russian 
economy from overheating.  Moreover, during 
2001-2004, the consumption boom did not put the external balance at risk, as large increases in 
imports were balanced by rapidly growing exports, mainly of oil.31  In other words, while Russian 
growth was increasingly driven by consumption, it was largely sustained by rising oil exports.  
B.  The policies and developments underlying recent Russian growth 
While the commodity structure of Russian exports was already highly concentrated during the 
1990s, it has become even more so since 2000.  Chart 3 shows that the strong growth of export 
volumes in 2000-2004 was driven overwhelmingly by the oil sector.  In this respect it is striking to see 
the huge differences in the export performance of Russia’s main sectors.  While the volume of oil 
exports grew by more than 60 per cent, the growth of the other major export sectors (ferrous and non-
ferrous metals, as well as machinery) was somewhere between 10 and 20 per cent,32 while gas exports 
even fell.33 
Monetary policy in 2000-2004 was affected by conflicting policy goals, and de facto was very 
loose.  The Central Bank of Russia (CBR) aimed at gradually reducing inflation while at the same time 
limiting the real appreciation of the rouble in order not to endanger the competitiveness of Russian 
industry.34  Given the large current account surpluses and decreasing net capital outflows during most 
of the period,35 this determination to prevent an overly rapid appreciation of the rouble compelled 
the CBR to intervene increasingly on the foreign exchange market.36  In the absence of efficient 
CHART 2 
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Source:  Russian Federal Service for State Statistics; World Bank, 
“Russia: transition meets development”, country economic memorandum for 
the Russian Federation (Moscow), April 2004; author’s estimates and 
calculations. 
Note:  Calculation based on adjusted sector weights, as estimated by 
the World Bank. 12 
CHART 3 
Exports by main sectors in Russia, October 2000-January 2005 
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Source:  Russian Federal Service for State Statistics; author’s estimates and calculations. 
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large-scale sterilization tools the accumulation of reserves led to a very strong monetary expansion.  
This loose monetary stance also meant that from mid-2000 interest rates on rouble lending to 
enterprises and individuals were very low, and real interest rates on deposits or government bonds 
were actually negative.  
Prudent fiscal policy was probably the Russian government’s single most important contribution 
to sustaining economic growth during 2000-2004.  Due to deep cuts in spending, general government 
expenditures (including all levels of government and social funds) were about 10 percentage points of 
GDP lower after the 1998 crisis than before it, while revenues relative to GDP remained at roughly 
pre-crisis levels.37  As a result, following a decade of large deficits, the federal budget was in surplus 
from 2000.  To be sure, fiscal responsibility was facilitated by growing revenues due to the favourable 
terms of trade and rapid growth.  However, the government largely resisted the temptation to spend 
this windfall, instead using a significant part of it to repay debt.38  The government also accumulated 
reserves, part of which were used to set up a stabilization fund.  Indeed, during 2000-2004, the federal 
budget was based on such conservative oil price assumptions that it probably would have remained 
roughly in balance even if oil prices had been at their long-term average throughout the period.39  
In part this was achieved by the 2000-2004 tax reform which simplified the tax system, while 
increasing its efficiency.40  At the same time, the tax system was restructured so as to capture a larger 
share of natural resource rents, especially windfall profits from high oil prices.  Together with a reduction 
in the rate of profits tax and the introduction of a simplified and unified social tax (involving the 
regrouping of several social payments), this was a first step towards increasing taxation of the resource 
sector, while using the freedom this generated to cut the overall rate of taxation on the economy as a 
whole.  
A sound fiscal position also played a key role in reviving private investment.  The fact that the 
government turned from being a net domestic borrower to a net lender helped to bring domestic 
interest rates down, while declining levels of sovereign foreign debt, together with improved 
perceptions of the Russian economy (at least until mid-2003), helped large Russian companies to 
borrow more, and at better terms, from foreign banks and international markets.  
The perception that property rights had become sufficiently secure (even though – with hindsight 
– this turned out to be misguided in some cases) was one of the factors contributing to the recovery of 
investment in 2000 and especially 2001.  This was particularly strong in the oil sector, where 13 
TABLE 1 
Investment in the oil sector in Russia, 1999-2002 
(1998=100) 
Upstream capital spending 
  1999  2000  2001  2002 
Total  .................................... 65  148 215 167 
Financial group owned a ....... 35 122 225 202 
Oil industry insider owned b 80  169  229  174 
State controlled c ......................... 73 173 244 169 
Source:  Rennaisance Capital Investment Bank estimates. 
a  Sibneft, TNK, YUKOS. 
b LUKOIL,  Surgutneftegaz. 
c  Bashneft, Rosneft, Tatneft. 
investment rose from roughly 25 per cent of total industrial investment before the crisis to around 35 
per cent from 2000.41  Strikingly, the growth of investment in the oil sector was initially led by 
companies controlled by the state or by oil industry insiders: by 2000, their investment was already 
70 per cent above 1998 levels.  This was in sharp contrast to oil companies whose owners’ property 
rights were perceived as less secure, for 
example, those owned by major financial 
groups.  In these companies investment in 2000 
was only marginally above 1998 levels (table 
1).  However, as perceptions of the security of 
property rights improved, the latter group of 
companies began to rapidly increase investment 
in 2001, soon reaching levels comparable to 
those of the former group.  This increase in 
private investment led to a sharp increase in oil 
production and exports in the following years.  
The output and export growth of Russian 
oil companies, however, was very uneven 
during 2001-2003 (chart 4).  Two points stand 
out.  First, state-controlled companies barely increased their output or exports.  Russia’s private oil 
companies accounted for almost all of the growth during this period.  Private oil producers thus 
directly accounted for somewhere between one fifth and one quarter of GDP growth, as well as most 
of the indirect contribution referred to above.  Secondly, the private companies that did the most to 
drive this growth were those controlled by major financial groups (the so-called finansisty) rather than 
those under the control of oil industry insiders (the neftyaniki).  
As mentioned already, it is unlikely that Russia would have been able to grow at anywhere near 
the rates it achieved in 2001-2004 had it not been for the oil sector.  What is more, the performance 
of the state-controlled oil companies and of other important state-controlled companies42 strongly 
suggests that Russia’s leading private oil companies would not have achieved the growth of the last 
few years if they had remained under state control, implying that the Russian growth rate would also 
have been significantly reduced. 
The above analysis, however, should not be taken to imply that there have been no positive 
developments outside the oil sector in recent years.  Other industrial sectors have also grown, and in 
many there have been large increases in labour productivity.  There has also been a large amount of 
consolidation in the industrial sector in the aftermath of the 1998 crisis.  Large industrial groups that 
have emerged were usually founded around some commodity exporting business, and in recent years 
have mainly pursued strategies of vertical integration.  The privately-owned industrial groups – usually 
tightly controlled by a small number of core shareholders – have generally restructured the businesses 
they owned or acquired in recent years and most of them are fairly well managed.  The productivity of 
many private enterprises has been increasing briskly, and often by more than in the economy as a 
whole.43 
C.  Sustaining Russian economic growth  
Having discussed the policies required for successful resource-based development, as well as 
briefly examining the main sources of Russian growth in recent years, the question now is whether, 
and under what conditions, Russia will be able to sustain its recent rates of economic growth. 
First, if Russia is to sustain growth at current rates, it must also be able to increase exports 
rapidly in the short to medium term.  This is because imports, which consist largely of consumer 
goods in which Russian output is either non-existent or uncompetitive, will in all likelihood tend to 
increase in line with disposable incomes as recent experience shows (chart 5).44  Since one of the main 
aims of economic growth is to raise living standards, high growth rates will almost certainly imply a 
continuation of increasing import demand.45  The large current account surplus in 2004 and the large 14 
projected surplus for 2005 might be interpreted as showing that Russia has ample room to increase 
imports without a corresponding rise in exports.  This, however, is probably not the case.  In 2004 and 
in the early months of 2005, the terms of trade 
were very favourable, but they are likely to 
deteriorate at some point in the future.  If oil 
prices had been at their long-term average of 
$19 per barrel (Urals) in 2004, and everything 
else remaining equal, the current account 
surplus would have been somewhere around 
$15 billion.  This is roughly the amount 
Russia needed to finance estimated capital 
flight and pay for underreported imports.   
Alternatively, assuming that import volumes 
in dollar terms continue to increase at their 
average rate in 2000-2004 and that the growth 
in the volume of exports slows to 5 per cent 
from 2005 onwards,46 the current account 
surplus would disappear by the end of 2006 
even with Urals crude at around $30 per 
barrel and non-hydrocarbon commodity 
prices staying at their high average levels of 
2004.  In theory, Russia might continue to 
enjoy a consumption boom and increase 
imports, even if the trade and current account 
balances were to swing into deficit.  This 
would imply, however, becoming structurally 
dependent on foreign capital – a highly risky 
strategy for a country that is as exposed to 
external shocks as Russia and that has so far had little success in attracting large and stable inflows of 
FDI.  Such a policy would in all likelihood lead to a balance of payment crisis at some point in the 
future. 
In short, if Russia wants to sustain a high rate of growth, it will have to be able to sustain rapid 
rates of export growth.  Russia’s revealed comparative advantage (RCA) in recent years has 
been in natural resources, especially hydrocarbons and energy-intensive basic manufactures (steel, 
aluminium, nickel, fertilizer), plus some other commodities.  What is more, the RCA in oil has been 
growing strongly in recent years, and oil, oil products and gas currently account for over 55 per cent of 
Russia’s exports (chart 6).  It is therefore clear that in the short and medium term these commodities 
will continue to dominate Russia’s exports, regardless of whether or not policies aimed at the 
diversification of the economy are successful.  Even if Russia manages to increase sharply its exports 
of more sophisticated manufactures, their contribution to total export growth will remain modest for 
some years to come, simply because they start from such a low base.  This implies that robust export 
growth in the short to medium term will probably not be possible without further increases in mineral, 
and especially hydrocarbon, exports.47 
Continued growth of hydrocarbon exports will require investment in the transport infrastructure, 
especially pipelines.  Moreover, as Russia’s own energy consumption is likely to increase in the 
coming years, assuming continued high rates of economic growth,48 increasing export potential will 
require substantial increases in production which at some point will necessitate the development of 
new fields.  It will therefore be important that fiscal and regulatory policies encourage the development 
of new oil fields to replace those currently in decline.  A healthy business climate and, especially, 
clearly assigned and secure property rights are therefore a sine qua non for private enterprises’ 
willingness and capacity to finance such large projects.  However, the handling of the Yukos case by 
the Russian authorities has caused a deterioration in the business climate, with negative economic 
repercussions. 
CHART 4 
The growth of output of oil companies in Russia, by form of 
ownership 
(Per cent change, 2001 to 2003) 
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While GDP growth was some 7.1 per cent in 2004, it slowed through the year as the growth of 
both oil extraction and total investment slowed, and capital flight rose sharply.  Moreover, the growth 
slowdown occurred in spite of a large fiscal stimulus and sharply improving terms of trade.  Other 
factors contributed to the slowdown, but it clearly owed much to the change in the business climate. 
Although much of the 2004/2005 slowdown in the growth of oil production was a 
consequence of the influence of 
government policy on the business climate, 
oil exports would probably have slowed 
somewhat anyway.  Oil cannot remain the 
chief source of Russian export growth 
indefinitely, as Russian oil reserves are 
comparatively limited.49 Given that world 
demand for gas will probably continue to 
increase and that Russia has the world’s 
largest proven gas reserves, the obvious 
candidate for expansion as oil exports slow is 
gas.  Much of the gas is in areas that are 
difficult to develop, but Russia’s gas 
monopolist, OAO Gazprom, as well as 
smaller gas producers, have demonstrated 
great technical ability in extracting it.  
Unfortunately, the gas industry is arguably 
Russia’s least reformed major sector and one of 
its least efficient.  Put simply, the sector in its 
current highly monopolized and heavily 
regulated configuration is unlikely to deliver 
sustained output and export growth, as 
indicated by its decidedly lacklustre 
performance in recent years.  Gas production has grown by around 1.5 per cent a year over the last five 
years, against an all industry average of over 6.7 per cent, and the sector’s record with respect to 
productivity and unit labour costs since 1998 has been by far the worst of any major sector in Russia.  
The oil sector has shown that with the correct incentives – as well as with multiple, privately-
owned production companies and fair access to the export infrastructure – production increases on an 
unexpected scale have been possible.  Milov50 observes that two of Russia’s hydrocarbon sectors were 
predominantly in private hands during the last decade (oil and coal), and two others were dominated 
by state-controlled monopolists (gas and electricity).  Whereas the two former sectors flourished, the 
latter two performed extremely poorly.  Therefore, if private gas producers were given equitable access 
to the trunk pipeline network and to export markets, they could probably increase investment and 
output very rapidly, and that would probably help to stimulate a better performance on the part of 
Gazprom itself.51 Unfortunately, in 2004-2005 the Russian state tightened its grip on key “strategic” 
sectors, especially natural resources.  It therefore seems that the structure of the oil sector is more 
likely to evolve in the direction of that prevailing in the gas sector, rather than the other way round.52  
Greater state control over resource-exporting industries is therefore likely to lead to less efficiency, 
more rent-seeking and slower growth in the very sectors that have been driving the Russian expansion 
in recent years. 
Another source of long-term growth could be the service sector.  With Russia becoming a richer 
country, the demand for services (banking, insurance, restaurants, travel, hotels, etc., will increase).  
As the Russian service sector, excluding the trading of oil and gas, is still largely underdeveloped, it 
has ample scope for growth.53  It will not develop very strongly, however, without a general increase in 
living standards, and for that Russia will need to increase its industrial production and exports. 
CHART 5 
Income, consumption and imports in Russia,  
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Source:  Russian Federal Service for State Statistics; author’s estimates and
calculations. 16 
As noted in the first part of this paper, a strategy of further developing natural resources exports 
is not without risks.  More precisely, three important potential dangers were identified that policy-
makers will need to address: external vulnerability, Dutch disease and specific institutional 
weaknesses.  Fortunately, the risks related to resource-based development should remain manageable if 
the right policy choices are made.  General recommendations concerning these choices were outlined in 
sections I.B-D above); the next task is to see 
how they translate into concrete measures in 
the specific context of the Russian economy.  
It is important to stress that there is no 
question here of recommending that Russia 
should follow a resource-based development 
path.  It is merely noted that resource-based 
development is the course that Russia has 
been following for several years and – 
given the present structure of the Russian 
economy – it is difficult to see how this 
could change in the short to medium term 
without causing major disruptions.  Even if 
policies favouring economic diversification 
were highly successful, Russia’s economic 
performance would continue to depend on 
natural resources for quite some time to 
come.  Therefore, if Russia wants to sustain 
a strong rate of growth in the short and 
medium term – which is one of the major 
policy objectives of the Russian authorities – 
it is hard to see how this can be achieved 
without further developing its natural 
resources.  In any case, even if Russia decided to hold back such development – despite the negative 
implications for economic growth – it would still remain a resource-based economy for some time to 
come.  The issue of managing a resource-based economy is therefore a highly topical one for Russia. 
Good macroeconomic, and especially fiscal, policies are particularly vital for Russia.  Improving 
the quality of institutions that enhance the sustainability and political feasibility of responsible 
macroeconomic policies is therefore a priority.  The recently established stabilization fund can play a 
crucial role in enhancing fiscal policy as a stabilization tool over the oil-price cycle, but there are some 
problems with its organization.  To understand this, it is necessary to consider briefly how the 
stabilization fund works.  Its primary purpose is to shield the budget from the potential consequences 
of a drop in oil prices.54  By law, the fund acquires automatically the surplus revenues from the natural 
resource extraction tax and the crude oil export duty that are generated when the price of Urals crude 
averages more than $20 a barrel (this threshold price was raised to $27 in 2005).  If the federal budget 
ends the year in surplus, most of the surplus may also be transferred to the fund in the early months of 
the following year.  The law stipulates that the first R500 billion accumulated in the fund can only be 
spent to cover a budget deficit when the Urals price falls below the threshold price.  Everything above 
that amount can be spent for other purposes, at the discretion of the authorities.  
There is nothing to stop the government from holding more than R500 billion in the reserve, but 
international experience shows that it is very difficult for governments to maintain a reserve if political 
will is the only factor preventing them from spending it.  Unless there are institutional rules to safeguard 
the stabilization fund, it is likely that the sums accumulated above the target level enshrined in the law 
will almost certainly be spent, if not by the current government then by one of its successors. 
If the stabilization fund is to fulfil its main purpose – fiscal stabilization – it must be large enough 
to insure the budget against the risk of several years of low oil prices.  On that criterion, R500 billion – 
around 2.5 per cent of projected GDP in 2005 – is not enough, especially given that the higher the cut-
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off price the greater is the potential for large revenue shortfalls.  (It is interesting to note in this respect 
that the finance ministry’s initial proposal was to accumulate the equivalent of around 8.7 per cent of 
GDP in the fund.)  R500 billion would probably not be sufficient to offset the revenue losses to the 
federal budget for much more than a year.55  Moreover, the R500 billion target figure is not indexed to 
inflation, nor to the growth of either federal spending or real GDP; given current rates of inflation and 
economic growth, the target figure relative to GDP is falling by 15-20 per cent a year.   
A straightforward solution would be to raise the R500 billion threshold substantially.  A new 
target level should also be set in relative terms – for example, as a percentage of GDP – rather than as 
an absolute sum.  It would also make sense to adopt a threshold price that is linked to a 10- or 15-year 
moving average of the Urals crude price.  The government’s ability to raise spending as the oil price 
rose would thus increase only gradually, but the impact of falling prices would also feed through only 
gradually, thus making fiscal adjustments less abrupt and painful.   
As mentioned earlier, keeping external debt low, as well as denominating it as far as possible in 
domestic currency and strictly limiting levels of short-term debt, can also help to reduce vulnerability 
to external shocks.  Recent empirical work suggests that the optimal external debt level for Russia 
would probably be under 40 per cent of GDP.56  The fact that Russia has been reducing its external 
sovereign debt in recent years is thus a positive development, as is the (albeit slow) shift from foreign 
currency to domestic currency sovereign debt issues.  
As pointed out earlier, there may also be some scope for efforts to avoid excessive exchange rate 
appreciation in periods of high oil prices which are often also accompanied by large short-term capital 
inflows.  In Russia, however, the pursuit of exchange rate goals with the monetary policy tools that 
were available in the past (mainly unsterilized exchange rate intervention) incurred significant costs in 
terms of inflation.  In this respect, it would have been helpful if the CBR had been given earlier a 
wider range of instruments in order to reduce the trade-off between inflation and rouble appreciation.57  
Gradual disinflation may have been necessary and desirable in order to prevent an overly rapid real 
appreciation of the exchange rate which could have negatively affected economic growth.  The crucial 
priority, however, is to keep inflation on a downward trajectory in order to manage inflation 
expectations and, especially, to avoid creating expectations that inflation will increase.  
If Russia continues on a path of resource-based development, with the mineral sector maintaining or 
increasing its share of exports, this will also increase the risk of Dutch disease.  In this respect it must be 
understood that for Russia – as well as for most other resource-based transition economies – the 
discovery and exploitation of natural resources as such is not the main source of the enhanced risk of 
Dutch disease.  Natural resource extraction already loomed large in these countries even in communist 
times.  However, their full weight in the economy only made itself felt at the start of the transition.  
Relative prices of primary raw materials, which had been held at artificially low levels under central 
planning, soared, as did exports of natural resources.  As a result the large differences in productivity 
between sectors finally became visible.  The export-oriented energy sectors were found to be highly 
competitive and profitable.  In contrast, many enterprises, especially in the manufacturing sector, were 
already barely competitive even at relatively weak exchange rates, and their situation further deteriorated 
when exchange rates started to appreciate as a result of surging exports of natural resources. 
Applied to Russia, this means that the relatively strong exchange rate puts a premium on the need 
for productivity increases in the non-mineral, tradable sectors.  So far, this seems to have led to 
increased efforts to restructure, and thus a large part of Russian industry seems to have withstood the 
increase in competitive pressures relatively well.  While the growth of industrial production slowed in 
2001-2002, it recovered to around 6-7 per cent in 2003 and 2004.  The main reason for this resilience 
appears to be significant increases in labour productivity in a large majority of sectors.58  However, 
much of the increase in productivity, especially in sectors where it was initially very low, has been due 
to what is often described as “passive” restructuring, namely, a drastic reduction in the labour force 
with relatively little investment and stagnant or declining output.59  Ironically, the very low levels of 
efficiency in many Soviet enterprises has actually facilitated productivity gains with little or no 
investment.  However, the easy gains have probably now been largely realized and there are natural 18 
limits to how far passive restructuring can go.  Active industrial restructuring, including private 
investment to modernize production capacities, is thus the sine qua non for continuing strong growth, 
implying that sustaining competitiveness in the face of mounting cost pressures may turn out to be 
increasingly difficult. 
As pointed out earlier, the tax system is also an important lever that can be used to avoid Dutch 
disease and assist the development of the non-resource sector.  In this respect the abolition of turnover 
taxes in Russia during 2001-2003 was a welcome development as they were relatively heavier on 
manufacturing industries.60  Also welcome were measures adopted in 2003-2004 to increase in an 
equitable fashion the tax burden on the oil sector.  However, instead of focusing on the oil industry 
alone there needs to be a broader attempt to increase the taxation of other resource or resource-related 
sectors without harming their future development.  
There are also some specific measures that could be taken to correct institutional weaknesses that 
may be aggravated by resource-based development.  For example, the importance was stressed of a 
strong civil society and a free press in the fight against corruption.  It was also argued that rules and 
regulations should be simple, transparent and standardized, with few exceptions and as little reliance as 
possible on bureaucratic discretion.  Many recent legislative changes in Russia seem to be at least partly 
motivated by this kind of reasoning: these include changes to fiscal federal relations and measures to 
curb bureaucratic interference in commercial activity, for example, by curtailing officials’ inspection 
powers, simplifying business registration and reducing the range of activities subject to licensing 
requirements.61  
With respect to diversification, Russia is a somewhat special case.  While a more diversified 
economic structure is something that in principle is desirable for economic reasons, a significant part 
of the Russian political elite – given their global ambitions for the Russian state – consider a 
resource-based development path as politically unacceptable.  Russia can therefore be expected to 
pursue policies to foster diversification in coming years.  Given the political context, however, it is 
especially important to have a clear understanding of the limits of diversification policies, as 
discussed in section I.E above, and to recognize that diversification is bound to be a long-term 
process. 
In addition to the standard recommendations with respect to diversification, as mentioned 
above, there are two points that are worth stressing in the specific case of Russia.  First, in spite of 
the rapid growth of lending to the private sector in 2002-2004, Russia’s financial sector remains 
underdeveloped.  Further reform, especially of the banking sector, is thus a key priority.  Given 
Russia’s potential in a number of advanced technology sectors, Russia is a resource-dependent 
economy where the emergence of a venture capital industry could actually be very helpful.   
Reducing the burdens imposed by heavy regulation and an often corrupt bureaucracy could play an 
especially important role in creating a more favourable environment for business (especially SME) 
and reducing barriers to entry.  In this respect, a more active competition policy is also needed.  This 
is especially true for sectors such as natural gas and electricity, where large, state-controlled 
monopolies need to be restructured, while creating legal and regulatory frameworks that combine 
robust competition with effective regulation.62  Finally, streamlining burdensome customs 
procedures could help potential Russian exporters (especially among SME) by facilitating their 
access to international markets.  However, none of the above can be achieved without substantial 
improvements in the probity, efficiency and accountability of the courts, the bureaucracy and other 
state institutions.   
Among less conventional measures, “new-style interventions”, beyond those mentioned above, 
could help to establish broader links and networks.  In this spirit, for example, there have been 
proposals to create research parks and technology transfer centres attached to the leading educational 
and research institutions.63  Many of these approaches, however, require the intervention of some part 
of the Russian administration in one way or another, so, again, increasing the quality of the state 
administration will be crucial to their prospects of success. 19 
III. Concluding summary 
This paper argues that while natural resources are sometimes seen as a “curse” for longer-term 
economic development, many of the potential problems can be avoided, or at least greatly 
mitigated by good macroeconomic policies and a sound institutional framework.  It draws attention to 
the argument that most resource-based economies have relied heavily on state ownership and 
intervention and this, rather than their dependence on natural resources, has been largely responsible 
for their disappointing economic performance.  The examples of economies with strong private 
entrepreneurship in resource sectors, such as Australia, Canada or the Scandinavian countries, 
demonstrate that, given the right institutions and policies, developing a successful modern economy 
based on exports of natural resources is feasible.  
In the case of Russia it argues that while diversification is an important long-term goal for 
Russia, its economy is bound to remain resource-based for some time to come even if diversification 
policies are relatively successful.  At least for the short and medium term, and until diversification has 
borne significant fruit, Russia should therefore ensure that, while avoiding the pitfalls often associated 
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